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I. INTRODUCTION

The financial crisis of 2008 and ensuing global recession triggered by the collapse
of the United States housing market is an event that forever changed the landscape of
the global economy.1 The economic downturn resulted in a stalled housing market,
high levels of unemployment, increased regulation of the financial industry, frozen
credit markets, and an overriding sense of anxiety regarding the state of economic
affairs both in the United States and abroad.2 Now more than five years removed from
the initial collapse, the U.S. economy continues to feel its effects as the financial
industry and accompanying sectors adapt to the new economic environment.3 One of
the more dramatic and controversial outcomes of the recession, however, was the nearfailure of General Motors and the subsequent “bailout” of the American automotive
industry facilitated by the federal government in 2009.4 The decision to subsidize a
private entity with federally funded capital was unprecedented when it was made, and
continues to provide a source of political and economic debate even years after its
implementation.5 While federal intervention in private industry is an inherently
controversial political topic, the failure of General Motors, and the struggles of the
automotive industry as a whole, signified a larger economic trend.
As the American auto industry stalled to the point of requiring government
subsidization in order to remain viable, a rhetorical term began to emerge within the
political and economic conversation that occurred as the U.S. set out on its path to
economic recovery. Economists, scholars and political pundits began using the term
“Rust Belt” to refer to the once heavily industrialized areas of the Midwest and
1 See Richard Florida, How the Crash Will Reshape America, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2009),
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/how-the-crash-willreshape-america/307293/.
2 David Luttrell, Tyler Atkinson & Harvey Rosenblum, Assessing the Costs and
Consequences of the 2007-09 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath, 8 ECONOMIC LETTER:
FEDERAL
RESERVE
BANK
OF
DALLAS
(Sept.
2013),
available
at
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/eclett/2013/el1307.pdf.
3 Patrick Sims, Since Lehman, the Financial Sector has Changed – for the Better, THE
AMERICAN
BANKER
(Sept.
12,
2013,
11:56
AM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/since-lehman-the-financial-sector-has-changedfor-the-better-1061992-1.html.
4 See Bill Vlasic & Annie Lowery, U.S. Ends Bailout of G.M., Selling Last Shares of Stock,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 9, 2013 4:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/u-ssells-remaining-stake-in-gm/?_r=0.
5 Dan Gearino, Debate still rages over auto bailout, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Oct. 14, 2012),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2012/10/14/debate-still-rages-over-autobailout.html.
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Northeast United States that, as of the most recent recession, experienced
“abandonment of factories, unemployment, outmigration . . . and overall decline.”6
Even today, many continue to categorize Ohio as a “rust belt” state,7 whose economic
decline can be linked at least in part to the number of jobs lost as a result of the failure
of U.S. automakers. In 2001, General Motors was Ohio’s largest employer, providing
jobs for nearly 26,000 residents.8 In March of 2008, during the preliminary phases of
the economic downturn, that number of General Motors’ jobs in Ohio stood at 12,300.9
As of 2012, General Motors employed just 9,533 Ohioans, a figure that represents a
stark departure from the company’s presence within the state in the time leading up to
the financial crisis.10 As economies in Ohio and other rust belt states continue to
recover, it is clear that a dramatic shift has taken place within this region that was once
so heavily dependent on manufacturing.11
The decline of the American automotive industry, accelerated by the frozen credit
markets in the time following the financial crisis, naturally resulted in a decline in the
strength of the manufacturing sector in Ohio.12 Jobs that can generally be classified as
part of the “service industry,” such as education, healthcare, and other professional
occupations, are replacing the manufacturing jobs that the Ohio population relied on
for more than a century.13 The increased presence in Ohio of newly discovered sources
of energy production, such as natural gas and oil, is driving increased investment and
creating new jobs in areas outside of the traditional manufacturing sector.14 In addition
6

Rust Belt, THE COLUMBIA ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, SIXTH EDITION, available at
http://www.answers.com/topic/rust-belt?cat=biz-fin; see Rust Belt Definition, THE FREE
DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Rustbelt.
7 See Scott Cohn, Is Ohio in the midst of a rust belt rebound?, CNBC (Dec. 10, 2014, 7:33
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102252242#.
8

General Motors Operations in Ohio, THE P LAIN DEALER (Sept. 25, 2009),
http://blog.cleveland.com/pdextra/2007/09/25FGGM.pdf (citing statistics from the General
Motors Corporation and the Ohio Department of Development).
9 Paul Roderick Gregory, Ohioans Are No Fools: Obama Did NOT Save Your Automotive
Jobs,
FORBES
(Oct.
28,
2012,
5:36
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2012/10/28/ohioans-are-no-fools-obamadid-not-save-your-automotive-jobs/.
10

Id. It should be noted, however, that GM’s decision to decrease its presence in Ohio from
2001 to 2008 may suggest that the recession was not the pure cause of the loss of manufacturing
jobs within the state, but that the economic situation merely accelerated an inevitable shift that
would have taken place (regardless of the state of the economy) at some point in the future.
11

Cohn, supra note 7.

12

See generally Greg R. Lawson, The Grand Shift – Ohio’s Economy Must Look Forward,
Not Back, THE BUCKEYE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y SOLUTIONS (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://buckeyeinstitute.org/the-liberty-wall/2012/01/12/the-grand-shift-ohios-economy-mustlook-forward-not-back/ (arguing that “manufacturing will likely never again be the main driver
of full employment in the future.”).
13

Id.

14

Nelson D. Schwartz, Boom in Energy Spurs Industry in the Rust Belt, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
8,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/business/an-energy-boom-lifts-theheartland.html.
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to a surge in the energy sector, Ohio is enjoying growth in other fields that require a
high level of technical expertise, such as the biomedical industry.15 Given this growth
in new, non-traditional industries, Ohioans are hopeful that the presently occurring
shift will result in cutting edge companies continuing their business in Ohio and that
those contemplating new ventures will consider Ohio as a starting point.16 As these
“non-traditional” economic sectors continue to grow, new opportunities for
employment will arise, as cutting edge businesses will be required to hire talented
individuals in order to keep up with the demand of these naturally fast-paced
industries.17
If the technology, healthcare, and energy sectors continue to thrive, a logical
consequence of this growth will be that established or newly formed Ohio businesses
in these fields will continue to hire employees. An ever present, yet controversial,
aspect of the hiring process is the negotiation of restrictive covenants contained in a
new employee’s employment agreement.18 These restrictive provisions, commonly
referred to as “Covenants Not to Compete (“CNC”)” or “Non-Competes,” at their
essence restrict an employee’s right to engage in particular conduct after the
employment relationship subject to the contractual arrangement is terminated.19 A
typical non-compete might prohibit an employee from leaving his or her company to
go work for a competitor within the industry. CNCs can take many different forms,
and many of these provisions that become part of employment agreements vary
significantly from the “boilerplate” terms of a “standard” non-compete. Employers
and employees are able to negotiate post-employment restrictions that contain a
combination of durational limitations,20 geographical restraints,21 or most commonly,

15 Robert L. Smith, Cleveland’s biomedical industry growing by billions, THE PLAIN
DEALER
(Apr.
13,
2014),
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2014/04/clevelands_biomedical_industry.html.
16

See generally Jay Foran, Northeast Ohio Capitalizes on Assets and Opportunities, THE
TRUST BELT (June 2013), http://www.trustbelt.com/northeast-ohio-capitalizes-on-assets-andopportunities/.
17

Ohio Among Top States for Tech Job Growth, THE BUSINESS JOURNAL (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://businessjournaldaily.com/economic-development/ohio-among-top-states-tech-jobgrowth-2012-12-7.
18 See generally Louis J. Papa, Employee Beware! Employment Agreements and What the
Technology Related Employee Should Know and Understand Before Signing That Agreement:
A Practical Guide, 19 TOURO L. REV. 393 (2003).
19 See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1960). For a sample of a covenant not to compete, see § 2:219. Sample non-compete provision,
Tex. Prac. Guide Emp. Prac. § 2:219.
20

Many post-termination restrictions will contain language that prohibits the former
employee from engaging in certain activities for a specified period of time following the end of
the contractual employment relationship.
21 A geographical restriction might establish that a former employee is prohibited from reentering a particular industry if the new employer is located within a particular region.
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restrictions that relate to the former employee’s use of proprietary or confidential
information obtained during the course of employment.22
Regardless of the inherently controversial concept of limiting an employee’s
ability to gain new employment after leaving a company, the legal community has
continued to struggle in its effort to determine the extent to which an employer should
be able to enforce a CNC against a former employee, if at all. Non-competes, and other
post-termination restrictions, contained within otherwise enforceable employment
agreements remain a highly litigated issue in state courts around the country.23
Because this litigation is almost always brought under a breach of contract theory, a
threshold issue in many cases is whether, and to what extent, an employer has the legal
right to enforce the restrictive covenant contained in a departing employee’s
employment agreement. While courts across the United States deploy different
analyses in determining the enforceability of a CNC, the majority of states will simply
enforce these restrictive covenants to the extent that they are “reasonable.”24 In
requiring this “rule of reason” approach, state courts that are willing to enforce only
some CNCs do afford these restrictive covenants a higher level of scrutiny than other
commercial contracts.25 Though the majority of state courts have the same basic
standard for enforceability, the nature of a “reasonability” test and the common use of
an analysis requiring state courts to balance various factors has led to uncertainty for
attorneys litigating post-termination restrictions and the judges tasked with ruling on
a provision’s enforceability. As a result, the “reasonability” test might not result in the
level of scrutiny intended by state courts adopting this approach.
In 1975, the Ohio Supreme Court joined the majority of the United States by
establishing its doctrine for non-compete enforceability in the now-landmark case,
Raimonde v. Van Vlerah.26 In other states, such as Colorado, California, and North
Dakota, courts are far less willing (and in some instances unable) to enforce a CNC
contained in an employment agreement.27 In this minority of states where courts do
22

CNCs contained in employment agreements will commonly contain a clause that
prohibits the employee from accessing or using any information obtained during the course of
employment at his or her new position.
23 Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Litigation Over Noncompete Clauses Is Rising, WALL ST. J.
(Aug.
14,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323446404579011501388418552 (noting “a
more than 60% rise over the past decade in the number of departing employees who are getting
sued by their former bosses for breaching [noncompete agreements].”).
24

Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 946 (2012)
(stating that “many states leave the evaluation of non-competition agreements to common-law
development” and that “[a]lthough the particulars differ to some extent, most of these states
apply a rule of reason . . . and regularly enforce non-competition agreements.”).
25 This heightened scrutiny can result from state courts’ application of a balancing test,
requiring an employer to prove that the non-compete is necessary to enforce a “protectable
interest” or requiring more than a “peppercorn” of consideration. Id. at 947.
26

Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975).

27

See Moffat, supra note 24, at 943 (citing Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil
Down: An Argument for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 677-78
(2008)) (noting that some states “refuse to enforce virtually all” varieties of non-competition
agreements).
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not readily enforce non-competes, CNC enforceability is determined within the
parameters of state legislation that works to prevent employers from utilizing these
common contractual arrangements.28 One of the main policy justifications for
legislation that essentially prohibits the use and enforcement of CNCs is the desire for
increased “employee mobility.”29 The public policy of promoting “employee
mobility” is important to note, particularly in light of the upcoming discussion of the
enforceability of CNCs in the context of an evolving economic environment.
While the connection between non-compete enforceability and economic
prosperity may not be immediately apparent, the economies in the states taking a more
restrictive approach to CNCs seem to be recovering more rapidly than Ohio, where
CNCs are enforced under the “reasonableness” standard.30 The hastened recovery and
increased level of economic growth within these particular states can be attributed in
large part to increased activity in the energy and technology sectors.31 As the economic
recovery in Ohio lags behind the rebound taking place in other parts of the country,32
it appears that our state is ready, willing and able to foster growth in new industries
such as energy and tech.33 It is in noting the differences in state courts’ standards and
analyses for determining the enforceability of non-competes contained in employment
agreements where the basic premise of this Note is found. There appears to be a
connection between a state’s willingness to enforce CNCs and the rate of economic
growth and speed of recovery. Given the economic performance in those states where
enforcement of non-competes is difficult, and Ohio’s need to foster the growth of new
industries, not only would a shift in thinking about Ohio’s view of non-competes be
justified, but such a change also may be necessary in order to ensure that Ohio does
not find itself left behind when the U.S. economy eventually makes a full recovery.
28

Id. at 944.

29 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 288 (Cal. 2008) (stating that California
courts “have consistently affirmed that [California’s statute prohibiting the use of non-compete
agreements] evinces a settled policy in favor of open competition and employee mobility.”).
30 See Alexander E.M. Hess & Michael Sauter, Top states with the fastest growing economies,
U.S.A. TODAY (June 15, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/15/stateswith-the-fastest-growing-economies/2416239/.
31

Id.; Dominic Rushe, Technology sector found to be growing faster than rest of US economy,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
6,
2012,
11:23
AM),
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/dec/06/technology-sector-growing-faster-economy.
32 See Robert L. Smith, Ohio still years away from economic recovery, study shows, THE
PLAIN
DEALER
(July
30,
2013),
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2013/07/ohios_economic_recovery_could.html;
Bruce Watson, Economic Recovery: Which States Are Bouncing Back Fastest?, DAILY FINANCE
(June 27, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/06/27/states-recovering-lostjobs-recession/.
33 See Jay Miller, Regional council is banking on Northeast Ohio’s potential, CRAIN’S
CLEVELAND
BUSINESS
(Nov.
16,
2014
4:30
AM),
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20141116/SUB1/311169964/regional-council-isbanking-on-northeast-ohios-potential; Michelle Jarobe McFee, Business groups hope study of
Ohio’s potential oil and gas boom shows fuel for economic growth, THE PLAIN DEALER (Sept.
6,
2011),
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2011/09/business_groups_hope_study_of.html.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, AND THEIR ENFORCEABILITY IN
CERTAIN STATES
Before analyzing a potential shift in Ohio’s standard for determining the
enforceability of CNCs and examining the analysis used by courts presented with a
contested non-compete, it is important to have a basic understanding of non-competes
and how courts treat these provisions. In determining whether a non-compete
contained in an employment agreement34 is enforceable, most courts are tasked with
balancing the interests of the employer seeking enforcement with the interests of the
employee who is attempting to take action following the termination of the
employment relationship at issue.35 Courts also consider the public policy promoted
by judicial enforcement of covenants not to compete, and often note that enforcing
these provisions flies in the face of certain community values.36 Understanding an
employer’s motivations for making use of CNCs, as well as the potential burden that
can result for former employees is critical in analyzing courts’ treatment of these
powerful contractual tools.
A. Use of Covenants Not to Compete In Employment Agreements: Interests of the
Employer, Burden on the Employee
1. Why Do Employers Use Non-Competes?
Defined generally, a non-compete is a “promise, usually in a sale-of-business,
partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a
stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.”37 Though an
employer and prospective employee are free to negotiate and tailor the terms of the
provision to meet specific needs and protect particular interests, all CNCs are entered
into with this basic purpose in mind. There are several reasons why an employer might
find it beneficial to negotiate and ultimately enter into a CNC with a new employee.
Employers use non-competes almost exclusively38 in an attempt to regulate the
conduct of an employee after their employment relationship with the company is
terminated. Most commonly, the conduct addressed by the CNC relates to the use by
a former employee of company property or information that could be valuable in the
hands of a competitor within the industry. In other situations, an employer will use a
non-compete simply to prevent an employee from working for another competing
entity for a certain amount of time or within a specific geographic area. For companies
who utilize non-competes, the overarching purpose of these provisions is the
protection from unfair competition.39 When a former employee continues to work in
34

In this Note, I analyze non-compete clauses contained in employment agreements, which
can be distinguished from a separate “non-compete” agreement.
35 See Blake, supra note 19 at 648-49 (outlining the formulation of the test of the validity of
postemployment restraints contained in the Restatement of Contracts).
36 Id. at 650 (arguing that the enforcement of postemployment restraints “has inevitable
effects which in some degree oppose commonly shared community values.”).
37

Covenant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).

38

As noted, companies use non-competes under other circumstances, such as during the
sale of a business.
39 William M. Corrigan & Michael B. Kass, Non-Compete Agreements And Unfair
Competition – An Updated Overview, 62 J. MO. B. 81 (2006) (noting that “[t]he purpose of
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the employer’s industry, his or her ability to the former employer’s property could be
detrimental to the former employer that expended resources in developing the former
employee’s knowledge of the field. The unfair competition that an employer seeks to
avoid through the use of a non-compete could also stem from a failure to protect
particular assets, such as customer bases, trade secrets, and any other information that
has been (or will be) critical to its overall success as an entity.40 By attempting to
restrict or completely prohibit a former employee’s ability to use information41
following the termination of the employment relationship, a company can use a noncompete to help to minimize the possibility of unfair competition as a result of misuse
of information in which the company has a proprietary interest.42
As noted above, non-compete provisions are often used by employers as a
mechanism for protecting particular types of proprietary information that would be
detrimental to a business in the hands of a competitor. In many instances, employers
use non-competes to protect information in the form of customer lists, general client
information, intellectual property, trade secrets, and data relating to business strategy
and planning.43 Information relating to the established clients of a particular business,
such as a customer list, is acquired by an employee only through their employment
with the company, and a CNC provides employers with at least some assurance that
this learned information will not be disseminated to other competitors within their
industry. Oftentimes non-compete provisions operate in concert with other restrictive
provisions contained in the employment agreement. In addition to a CNC that
prohibits an employee from making use of proprietary information, a standard
employment agreement may contain non-disclosure or confidentiality provisions.
While a CNC focuses on a former employee’s use of company information during the
course of his or her new employment venture, these non-disclosure provisions operate
more generally to prohibit an employee from disseminating proprietary information to
any third party. In negotiating these restrictions on the use of proprietary information,
employers have the ability to make the prohibitions as broad or as narrow as they deem
necessary to protect their interest, and in some instances employers feel justified in
including a lengthy, specific list of information that the former employee must refrain
from using following termination. By ensuring that certain information remains
proprietary, employers view non-competes and non-disclosure agreements as a way
of protecting the information that has (or could potentially) made their business
valuable.
In addition to mitigating the risk for unfair competition created by certain conduct
of a departing employee, employers may justify the use of a non-compete as a way to
enforcing a non-compete agreement ‘is to protect an employer from unfair competition by a
former employer.’”).
40 Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in
Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 676 (2008).
41 See Syncom Industries, Inc. v. Wood, 920 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2007) (an example of a
company’s use of a non-compete to protect its information from misuse by former employees).
42

See Howard Kurman, Should your company use non-compete agreements?, THE DAILY
RECORD (Sept. 26, 2014), http://thedailyrecord.com/2014/09/26/should-your-company-usenon-compete-agreements/ (offering an illustrative example of potential misuse of company
information by a former employee that would result in unfair competition to the employer).
43

Id.
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protect their investment in a particular employee. In today’s business environment,
companies who invest more resources in training and developing their employees
enjoy a noticeable return on their investment in the form of increased profit margins.44
Non-competes contained in employment agreements offer a way for companies to
protect both prior investment in employee development and any future investment in
the employee, and ensure that they (and not a competitor) realize their full potential
return on investment in the form of enhanced training and development.45 A company
may be unlikely to fully invest in a new employee if it is possible for the employee to
acquire a skillset through the employer’s investment, terminate the employment
relationship, and later apply this skillset for the benefit of an industry competitor.
Accordingly, a new employee’s willingness to enter into a CNC as part of his or her
employment agreement could actually serve as an incentive for employers to devote
additional resources to train or develop the new hire. Potential employees might
benefit from an employer’s willingness to invest in staff members by adding to their
skillset while gaining valuable on-the-job experience, ultimately making them more
valuable to a company’s operation.
2. Potential Burdens Imposed On Employees By Non-Competes
While employers undoubtedly benefit from the use of CNCs, it is important to
understand that by entering into a non-compete, an employee will be subject to certain
burdens that do not affect “fully mobile” employees. First, many employees feel that
by agreeing to be bound by a non-compete, they are effectively limiting their
bargaining power during any future negotiations with the employer.46 For employees,
one of the primary sources of leverage during any negotiation regarding the
employment relationship is the freedom to terminate the relationship and the
accompanying threat to the employer that a valuable employee might later use his or
her talent for the benefit of a competitor.47 Second, the recent pronounced increase in
non-compete litigation standing alone burdens employees in several ways. Because
there are a high number of instances where non-compete disputes evolve into
litigation, observant potential employees are aware of the threat of a lawsuit that arises
upon entering into the covenant. Entering into a CNC, especially in the case of higherlevel employees whose non-compete might be strenuously negotiated, could lead to
mutual feelings of distrust between the employer and employee even before the first
day on the job. In the event that the parties do in fact end up litigating the enforceability
of the CNC, some argue that a potential lawsuit is less of a burden on employers (due
44 Emad Rizkalla, Not Investing In Employee Training Is Risky Business, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (June 30, 2014, 4:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emad-rizkalla/not-investingin-employee_b_5545222.html (citing a report by HR Magazine showing that “companies
investing $1,500 or more per employee per year on training average 24 percent higher profit
margins than companies with lower yearly training investments.”).
45 See Pivateau, supra note 40 (arguing that “a noncompete agreement encourages
employers to invest in their employees.”).
46

Blake, supra note 19, at 627.

47

Kevin G. Powers & Linda Evans, Non-Compete Agreements: A Proposal for Fairness
EMPLOYMENT
LAWYERS,
and
Predictability,
THE
http://www.theemploymentlawyers.com/Articles/Noncompetition.htm#_ednref16 (last visited
Jan. 8, 2014).
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to their level of resources) and would likely impose a great hardship on the employee
who is party to the suit.48 In addition to facing the potentially unaffordable costs of
litigation, a former employee in the middle of litigation with a former employer might
ultimately be a less desirable candidate for future employment with another firm.49
Entirely separate from the tangible burdens discussed above, a non-compete places
limits on the employee that may run counter to certain accepted public policy ideals.
By entering into a CNC with an employer, an employee is effectively placing a selfimposed limit on his right or ability to gain employment after the termination of the
contractual relationship. The ability to find another job, otherwise known as
“employee mobility,” can be greatly diminished by a stringent, yet readily enforceable
non-compete. While courts in states using the “reasonability” standard of
enforceability take the interests of the departing employee into account, these courts
readily uphold limits on employee mobility if an employer purports to be using the
restraint to protect a recognized interest. However, courts in those states where CNCs
are not readily enforceable place great emphasis on an employee’s personal freedom
to follow his or her own interests,50 and are careful to limit an employer’s ability to
hinder an employee’s mobility. Non-compete clauses in employment agreements can
also have adverse effects on economic competition. By limiting employee mobility,
the broad enforcement of CNCs can lessen competition by “intimidating potential
competitors and by slowing down the dissemination of ideas, processes, and
methods.”51 Scholars have conducted studies on non-competes and their effect on
employee mobility, the findings of which will be discussed later in this Note. While
the use of non-competes may be necessary for employers in some contexts, the
potential burdens imposed on employees by these provisions should not be
overlooked, and may provide justification for a shift in the standard for determining
their enforceability.
B. The Treatment of Covenants Not To Compete Under Ohio Law and
In Other Jurisdictions
As mentioned, courts across the United States apply a variety of standards and
analyses in determining whether a non-compete clause is enforceable. These different
approaches, each of which in turn impacts how frequently employers utilize noncompetes, can each be traced back to the common-law courts’ initial analysis of postemployment restraints. Courts have been discussing and analyzing the permissibility
of the use of non-competes, or “restraints of trade” as they were known during the
traditional common-law era, for more than 500 years.52 As economic industry and
business methods have evolved, courts have facilitated changes in their analysis in
order to formulate a standard that accurately reflects the prevalent social and economic
values of a particular time frame.53 After reviewing the evolution of judicial treatment
of non-competes from the common-law era to the present day, it becomes increasingly
48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 288 (Cal. 2008).

51

Blake, supra note 19, at 627.

52

Id. at 626.

53

Id. at 626-27.
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clear that the stage is set for courts to facilitate another change in the way they handle
these restrictive covenants.
1. The Origin and Evolution of the Common-Law Restrictive Doctrine
For nearly 250 years, courts analyzing the enforceability of a CNC relied almost
exclusively on an English court’s holding in Mitchel v. Reynolds. The court in Mitchel
analyzed a contractual covenant in which a baker promised not to practice his craft for
a certain period of time following the transfer (sale) of his business, and eventually
established a presumption of invalidity with regard to “restraints of trade.”54 The court
reasoned that this presumption of invalidity was justified by the potential “mischief”
that could result from restraints of trade such as the non-compete at issue.55 After
weighing the potential societal harms stemming from the use of restraints of trade with
the right of private parties to freely enter into a binding contractual arrangement, the
court ultimately concluded that the presumption of invalidity attached to restrictive
covenants could be overcome and that a covenant in the context of the transfer of the
baker’s business was enforceable.56
In its analysis of the interests of and potential harm to both parties to the agreement
and to society as a whole, the Mitchel court articulated the first standard for noncompete enforceability based on the “reasonableness” of the provision. The factors
weighed by the court in its determination are substantially similar to those taken into
account by modern courts analyzing a CNC. In addition to providing the framework
for subsequent inquiries into the validity of non-competes, the Mitchel court also made
an important note when it addressed these provisions in the context of employment
agreements. The court noted that when a non-compete is contained in an employment
agreement, the potential for harm and abuse may increase.57 In addressing the
distinction between restraints imposed on a party to the sale of a business and
restrictive covenants contained in employment contracts, the court inferred that it
would be more difficult for a party to make a showing that a covenant falling into the
latter category is “reasonable” and thus should be enforced.58
54

Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.).

55

The “mischief” being referred to by the Mitchel court was the possible loss of the
employee’s means of earning a living and the possibility that society as a whole might lose the
services of a useful member. The court also noted that the ready enforcement of such provisions
could result in abuse by corporations seeking to establish a monopoly in an industry. In noting
these potential harms and using them in the ultimate analysis of enforceability, the Mitchel court
established that its decision was based primarily on public policy. It is this public policy against
the use of restraints of trade that forms the basis for later courts’ analysis of non-competes. Id.;
Blake, supra note 19, at 629.
56

Blake, supra note 19, at 629. The court justified its finding that the provision should be
enforced despite the presumption of invalidity of restraints of trade by holding that “to refuse
to enforce reasonable restraints accompanying the transfer of a business would result in
unnecessary hardship or loss” to the baker, who would only be able to sell his business to a
buyer who could be protected by an enforceable non-compete. Id.
57 Id. at 629-30. The Mitchel court stated that employers may abuse the right to include
restrictive covenants in employment agreements by using them in a way that would allow an
employer to control an apprentice in his future employment.
58

Id. at 675.
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The Mitchel court would also influence the modern analysis of non-competes by
analyzing a pre-existing judicial distinction between two different types of restrictive
trade covenants. In Rogers v. Parrey, an earlier English court made a distinction during
its analysis between “general restraints” and “particular restraints.”59 In the context of
employment agreements, a “general restraint” could be defined as a restriction on
one’s right to gain employment that extended over a broad geographic area, or that
would bind an employee for an indefinite amount of time.60 A “partial restraint,” like
the one at issue in Mitchel, is a covenant whose geographic and durational scope would
be limited so as to apply only to a small number of people within a specific industry.61
The Mitchel court concluded that a “general restraint” could never be valid62, and that
it could only uphold a “partial restraint” under particular circumstances.63 In
addressing the difference in how these two types of restraints should be viewed, the
Mitchel court essentially established that CNCs would only be enforced when it was
reasonable to do so under the circumstances.
Through the nineteenth century, American courts would apply the Mitchel holding
in their analysis of CNCs contained in employment agreements.64 However, as
industry and the nature of the employment relationship evolved, it became
increasingly difficult for courts to articulate a sound and predictable analysis within
the vague “reasonableness” framework of Mitchel. More specifically, courts in the
United States found difficulty in the distinction between “general” and “partial”
restrictions, and were beginning to place more emphasis on protecting the employee
from the potential harm imposed by these provisions.65 While working through these
difficulties, courts began to depart from the Mitchel standard and instead began to
analyze the facts and circumstances under which the parties entered into a noncompete.66 In considering the specific interests of the employer and employee in their
analysis as opposed to classifying the restrictive provision, courts eventually adopted
the first version of the “reasonableness” approach to determining enforceability.67
Under the common-law “reasonableness” approach adopted in some form by the
majority of states today, the main task for a court is to balance the interests of the
employer with the interests of the employee in light of society’s interest in promoting

59

Id. at 630 (citing Rogers v. Parrey, (1613) 80 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B.)).

60

Id.

61

Id.

62 Id. (citing Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 349). Because it would never be reasonable to prevent
one from practicing his trade in cases where neither party benefits, the court held that general
restraints were “only oppressive” and thus never valid.
63 Id. (citing Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 347-52). The court would only find a partial restraint
to be valid if there was “good and adequate consideration” offered and in circumstances under
which the court could find that the parties entered into a “just and honest contract.” Id. at 352.
64

Id. at 638-39.

65

Id. at 643-44.

66

Id. at 647.

67 See id. at 648-49 (providing an overview of the formulation of the common-law
reasonableness test for determining the validity of post-employment restraints).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss3/9

12

2015]

LOOSENING THE RUST BELT

719

open and fair competition.68 As discussed earlier, employers have an interest in
preventing unfair competition that may result from actions of a former employee, and
employees have an interest in maximizing mobility.69 As a society, we are thought to
have a general interest in promoting an economic environment with open competition
in order to maximize innovation and to facilitate the free exchange of ideas. In keeping
these competing interests in mind, courts adopting the common-law reasonableness
test are willing to enforce non-competes in order to preserve the interests of an
employer, but only if the provision does not result in significant harm to employees or
important societal values.
In the first part of the reasonableness inquiry, a court analyzing a CNC will
consider the employer’s motivation or purpose for negotiating the provision with the
employee. If the employer can show that it had a “legitimate commercial reason” for
entering into the non-compete, it can be said that it has “met its first burden” in
establishing that the restriction on an employee’s post-termination conduct is
“reasonable.”70 In other words, so long as the court finds that an employer used the
CNC to protect a legitimate business interest,71 the provision satisfies the first part of
the reasonableness test. The two most common “legitimate commercial reasons”
asserted by employers seeking to justify the use of a non-compete are the protection
of its goodwill as a business and the protection of trade secrets or other proprietary
information.72 By requiring a finding that the CNC was used by an employer for a
legitimate reason, and only enforcing restraints under circumstances where there is
some threat of unfair competition, courts adopting the common-law approach mirror
the approach taken in Mitchel in the first prong of the overall inquiry.
After finding that an employer entered into (and is attempting to enforce) the CNC
to protect or promote a legitimate business reason, a court operating under the
common-law restrictive doctrine will analyze the express terms of the agreement. The
basic task of the court here is to assure that the non-compete is drafted in a way that
“is no more extensive than is necessary” to protect the employer’s interest purportedly
protected by the provision.73 In making this determination, a court will analyze
jurisdiction-specific factors that will ultimately allow it to determine whether the
actual scope or reach of the CNC is reasonably necessary to protect the employer.74
Non-competes imposing restrictions that fall outside of the scope necessary to protect
68

Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete
Agreements: Recent Trends And An Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 114-15
(2008).
69

Id.

70

Id.

71

As opposed to using the covenant for the sole purpose of restricting the employee or
limiting competition.
72

Id. at 116.

73

Id. at 117.

74 In determining the actual “scope” of the CNC, a court might consider the duration of the
provision, the geographic area to which the restriction applies, and the types of activity
prohibited by the clause. If the court determines that it would have been reasonable for the
employer to protect its interests using a provision with a more narrow scope, the provision will
be deemed invalid. Id. at 117-18.
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the employer – such as those that generally prohibit an employee from working for a
particular competitor or that prohibit an employee from entering an industry in which
the employer is not directly involved – are invalid.75 In this portion of the analysis, a
court is essentially weighing the potential burden placed on the employee by the CNC
against the interests of the employer seeking enforcement, a consideration first
articulated by the English courts.
Courts using the traditional common-law approach have adopted several
procedural rules and requirements that exemplify judicial reluctance to strict CNC
enforcement. In adopting what is now termed the “blue pencil doctrine,” courts have
the power to sever and enforce the valid covenants contained within a larger and
otherwise unenforceable non-compete.76 However, a court does not have the power to
modify the terms of an otherwise unenforceable non-compete in a manner that would
result in a reasonable restriction. By requiring a finding of reasonability before the
exercise of the blue pencil power, courts prevent employers from drafting overly broad
restrictions knowing that a court would change language to make the covenant
enforceable. Procedurally, courts adopting the common-law approach have adopted
certain safeguards that make it difficult for an employer to succeed in proving that a
non-compete is reasonable under the overarching inquiry. Furthermore, the
enforceability of a CNC is held to be a question of law, but showing that a provision
is reasonable requires the employer to make a relatively specific factual showing.
After proving that a non-compete is reasonable, an employer would also have to
establish irreparable injury in order to obtain injunctive relief, a remedy commonly
sought in the context of non-compete litigation.
The basic common-law analysis and accompanying procedural rules combine to
form a standard for enforceability that creates a heavy presumption of invalidity of
CNCs contained in employment agreements. Under the traditional approach a noncompete is subject to a high level of scrutiny during a court’s initial analysis, making
it difficult for an employer to show that a questionable provision is reasonable.
However, this “employee-friendly” standard has been modified by courts in recent
years and many CNCs are now subject to a more relaxed standard of reasonableness.
As the economic and legal systems have continued to evolve in the United States,
courts in many jurisdictions are continuing to facilitate a shift to a more “employerfriendly” analysis. As a result of these changes, it is now far easier in many places for
employers to enforce restrictive covenants contained in employment agreements.
2. The Modern Approach: The Ohio Relaxed Reasonableness Requirement as an
Employer-Friendly Standard
Whether caused by social, economic, or purely legal development, courts across
the U.S. are departing from the analysis first announced in Mitchel and the
“traditional” common-law reasonableness requirement under which CNCs have been
analyzed for so many years. Courts have and continue to modify their standards for
non-compete enforceability as they alter their analyses in hopes of formulating a
process that better reflects the current economic and social climate. For the most part,
these changes can be classified as attempts by the court to adopt a more permissive
standard for determining enforceability. A common example of this departure is
evidenced by the willingness of many courts to broaden the permissible scope of
75

Id.

76

Id. at 118-19.
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CNCs by expanding the definition of an interest deemed to be “legitimate” and worthy
of protection through use of a non-compete. Many legal scholars consider changes that
have taken place in Ohio courts to be an illustrative example of the shift away from
the traditional common-law standard and the emergence of a new, more employerfriendly analysis.
Ohio courts’ treatment of non-competes in employment agreements can be divided
into two separate time periods: pre-1975 and post-1975. Before its decision in
Raimonde, Ohio state courts followed a “strict version of the common-law
reasonableness test” announced by the Ohio Supreme Court in Briggs v. Butler.77 The
reasonableness test consisted of a three-part analysis under which a court would
enforce a non-compete only if: “(1) the restriction was not beyond that reasonably
necessary for the protection of the employer and his business; (2) the provisions were
not unreasonably restrictive upon the rights of the employee; and (3) the covenant did
not contravene public policy.”78 Ohio courts followed and reinforced this restrictive
approach in subsequent cases, such as Arthur Murray Dance Studios79 and Extine.80
Before 1975, CNCs in Ohio were subject to the heightened scrutiny of the traditional
common-law approach and in turn were more difficult to enforce. While it is unclear
exactly what led the court to change its approach, in 1975 Ohio adopted a watereddown version of the common-law doctrine that can accurately be described as a
“relaxed reasonableness” standard of enforceability.
In Raimonde, the Ohio Supreme Court departed from the three-step analysis of the
restrictive common-law approach and established a new “reasonability test” to be used
by courts in determining the enforceability of a CNC contained in an employment
agreement. In doing so, the Raimonde court established two inquiries or “sub-tests,”
that combine to make up the more broad reasonableness analysis. When analyzing the
validity of a non-compete, Ohio courts apply a three-prong balancing test before
weighing a multitude of “reasonableness factors” to make an ultimate determination
of whether a CNC is enforceable.81
Under the Raimonde standard, an employer’s non-compete agreement is
enforceable “to the extent necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests.”82
While this standard is seemingly straightforward, the analysis that courts must conduct
becomes fairly complicated. Raimonde represents Ohio’s adoption of the basic “rule
77

Id. at 123.

78

Briggs v. Butler, 45 N.E.2d 757, 758 (Ohio 1942).

79 Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 17 (1952).
Here, an Ohio court declined to enforce a non-compete against a former employee who wanted
to work at a competing dance studio. The court found that the employer did not meet the heavy
burden necessary to justify enforcing a “presumptively void” restrictive covenant. The court
also relied on the public’s interest in prohibiting restraints of trade, noting that these restrictions
should be “cautiously considered, carefully scrutinized, looked upon with disfavor, strictly
interpreted, and reluctantly upheld.”
80

Extine v. Williams Midwest, Inc., 200 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio 1964). Here, the Ohio Supreme
Court used the “blue pencil rule” applied under the traditional common-law approach, giving
other courts the power and discretion to fully eliminate unenforceable provisions contained
within a non-compete.
81

Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975).

82

Id. at 547.
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of reasonableness,” a standard under which a non-compete is enforceable if a court
determines that the provision is “reasonable.” In making its determination, a court is
instructed to balance the potential undue hardship on the employee that results from
enforcement of the provision with the need for the employer to protect its legitimate
interests through judicial enforcement of the non-compete.83 Accordingly, the
Raimonde court held that a non-compete is “reasonable” if “it is no greater than is
required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the
employee, and is not injurious to the public.”84 Raimonde instructed courts to conduct
this balancing test based on the facts of each particular case and if the facts show that
the provision is “reasonable,” a court may enforce the provision.
The Raimonde inquiry does not end here, however. In addition to the three-part
balancing test, the court also outlined eight separate factors that support a finding that
a CNC is “reasonable” or a finding that the restriction is unreasonable and thus
invalid.85 The appropriate role intended by the Raimonde court of these factors, which
are mentioned by the court following a discussion of its departure from the “blue
pencil test,” within the overall reasonableness analysis is unclear. While courts
applying the Raimonde decision have continued to struggle to determine the
appropriate role of the reasonableness factors within the three-part balancing test, four
of the eight factors listed by the court are almost always discussed during the analysis.
These four factors – the geographic scope of the restraint, the duration of the covenant,
the benefit and detriment of employer and employee, and the public interest – seem to
have become a consistent part of the enforceability inquiry in Ohio courts.86 While
these factors are most often discussed by Ohio courts, it is unclear whether they have
formally become part of the analysis because they relate to commonly used restrictive
provisions in non-competes, or whether Ohio courts discuss them because they think
that Raimonde compels them to do so.
The Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Raimonde, which discarded the commonlaw restrictive doctrine for determining enforceability established by Briggs, signaled
the beginning of an era during which Ohio courts would develop and use a far more
“employer-friendly” standard in determining the enforceability of a CNC. Though the
practical result of the Raimonde opinion clearly indicates a shift in thinking about
CNCs and their enforceability, the court implies in the language of the opinion that it
83

Id.

84

Id.

85

“Among the factors properly to be considered are: ‘(t)he absence or presence of
limitations as to time and space; whether the employee represents the sole contact with the
customer; whether the employee is possessed with confidential information or trade secrets;
whether the covenant seeks to eliminate competition which would be unfair to the employer or
merely seeks to eliminate ordinary competition; whether the covenant seeks to stifle the inherent
skill and experience of the employee; whether the benefit to the employer is disproportional to
the detriment to the employee; whether the covenant operates as a bar to the employee’s sole
means of support; whether the employee’s talent which the employer seeks to suppress was
actually developed during the period of employment; and whether the forbidden employment is
merely incidental to the main employment.’” Id. (citations omitted).
86

See Pierre H. Bergeron, Navigating the “Deep and Unsettled Sea” of Covenant Not to
Compete Litigation in Ohio: A Comprehensive Look, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 373, 376-81 (2000)
(discussing Ohio courts’ treatment of four particular factors contained in the Raimonde
analysis).
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is facilitating a shift to a more employer-friendly analysis. In replacing the traditional
blue-pencil test for a more relaxed rule of reasonableness, the Raimonde court noted
that it was moving away from the traditional common-law doctrine because of its
impracticability.87 However, the court seems to justify its shift in thinking based on its
view that the common-law doctrine has not worked well in practice for employers, yet
offers no discussion on the effects of the shift on employees. The court was concerned
that under the traditional common-law doctrine of Briggs, “employees may gain the
benefit of overly-lenient employment restrictions.”88 The Raimonde court also rejected
the argument that this new standard would “allow employers to dictate restraints
without fear,” concluding that most “employers who enter contracts do so in good
faith, and seek only to protect legitimate interests.”89
While the Raimonde court departed from the traditional common-law
enforceability analysis by imposing a less stringent definition of a “reasonable” noncompete, courts in other jurisdictions have established new standards that differ in
other ways. Instead of making it easier for an employer to prove that the scope of the
CNC is “reasonable,” some states have liberalized the first part of the traditional
common-law analysis. Recall that a court operating under the common-law restrictive
doctrine must first determine whether the employer made use of the non-compete in
an attempt to protect a “legitimate” business interest.90 By expanding the definition of
a “legitimate” business interest, courts in some states have modified their
enforceability analysis in a way that eases the burden placed on employers in proving
the overall reasonableness of a CNC.91 State courts have expanded this definition by
allowing businesses to use non-competes to protect information that is not defined as
a traditional “trade secret,”92 and to protect an interest in employer investment in
general employee training.93
In cases following the Raimonde decision, the Ohio Supreme Court mirrored the
willingness of courts in other states to expand the list of business interests considered
to be “legitimate” for the purposes of the non-compete analysis. In Rogers v. Runfola,
the court seemingly made another stark departure from the traditional common-law
doctrine by validating an otherwise unreasonable non-compete because of the nature
of the interest the employer sought to protect by imposing the restraint.94 The court
87

Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 546.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Garrison & Wendt, supra note 68, at 128.

91

Id. at 129.

92 See, e.g., L.M. Saliterman & Assocs. v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that an employer may enforce a non-compete to protect confidential information
that does not fall within the traditional definition of a “trade secret”).
93 Under the traditional common-law analysis, an employer would be deemed to have a
“legitimate” business interest to protect its investment in company education or training by
which the employee acquires a unique, specialized skill. Some courts now enforce noncompetes used by an employer to protect an investment in more general training and education.
See Borg-Warner Protective Servs., Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky.
1996).
94

Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1991).
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applied the three-part balancing test from Raimonde and concluded that the noncompete at issue was unreasonable because it imposed an undue hardship on the
employees subject to the provision.95 However, the court went on to analyze the
interest that the employer sought to protect. The court found that the employer was
seeking to enforce the CNC to protect its interest in training provided to the departing
employees, an interest it deemed to be “legitimate.”96 Thus the court held that the noncompete was enforceable, despite the fact that it was unreasonable under the balancing
test and was used to protect an employer’s interest only in “general training.”97 The
Rogers holding symbolizes the willingness of Ohio courts to expand the definition of
a “legitimate” business interest, and, furthermore, the willingness of the court to
elevate these legitimate interests over any burden placed on the employee by a CNC.
The relaxed standard of reasonableness applied in Ohio and other states represents
a sizeable departure from the rigid common-law restrictive doctrine used through the
1970s. This new, more “employer-friendly” standard has made it far easier for
employers to use and enforce non-competes against former employees.
3. The Alternative Modern Approach: Limiting Non-Compete Enforcement via
Statute: Treatment of CNCs Under Statutes in California and Other States
As courts in Ohio and a majority of other states have established and continued to
apply a less rigid standard for determining the enforceability of non-competes, other
states have deviated from the traditional common-law doctrine in an entirely different
way. Most notably, state legislatures in California and North Dakota have enacted
statutes that effectively prohibit employers from using non-compete provisions in
employment agreements.98 The enactment of statutory limits on the enforcement of
CNCs seems to be motivated by a strong public policy favoring employee mobility.
As a result of the state legislatures’ willingness to promote the free flow of employees
within the economy, some jurisdictions have created a standard for the enforceability
of non-competes that remains more in line with the traditional common-law doctrine
and its presumption of unenforceability that attaches to “restraints of trade” within the
context of employment relationships.
In California, the combination of antitrust legislation, statutory prohibitions on the
use of non-competes, and court decisions interpreting these provisions has virtually
eliminated the use of CNCs by employers. Section 16600 of California’s Business &
Professions Code is part of the state’s first antitrust statute, and imposes a general
prohibition on contracts “by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind.”99 Courts have interpreted this provision as
being in place to offer broad protection for “one of the most cherished commercial
95

Id. at 544.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §16600; N.D. CENT. CODE §9-08-06 (2006). More recently,
interest groups in Michigan, Washington, and Massachusetts are engaged in an effort to enact
similar legislation in hopes of limiting the use of non-competes by employers. Phillip Korovesis,
Korovesis and Fuhs: Defending Non-Compete Agreements, THE DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 20,
2015), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2015/03/20/korovesis-fuhs-non-competeagreements/25039965/.
99

Id.
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rights we possess – the important legal right of persons to engage in businesses and
occupations of their choosing.”100 By protecting the right of California citizens to
freely seek employment, state courts have interpreted Section 16600 in a more specific
manner, holding that the statute operates as “an absolute bar to postemployment
restraints.”101 Under the California statute, a non-compete is void if as a result of
enforcement the employee subject to the restrictions is “not as free [to engage in a
competing business] as he would have been if he were not bound by it.”102 It is clear
from both the enactment of the statute and the subsequent judicial interpretation that
the use of non-competes is strongly disfavored in California.
Despite California’s strong public policy against the enforcement of CNCs, some
courts interpreting Section 16600 facilitated a shift away from the general prohibition
on non-competes by creating exceptions under which a court could enforce a
restrictive covenant. In a series of decisions beginning in the late 1980s, the Ninth
Circuit developed a class of “narrow restraint exceptions,” under which an employer
might be able to enforce a non-compete despite the statutory prohibition contained in
Section 16600. The development of these “narrow restraint exceptions” can be traced
to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Campbell v. Board of Trustees, where the court
concluded that the prohibition contained in Section 16600 applied only to particular
types of CNCs. In Campbell, the court held that Section 16600 would only invalidate
a non-compete that prohibited a departing employee from engaging in an entire
profession, trade or business.103 Non-competes that barred an employee from
“pursuing only a small or limited part of the business, trade, or profession,”104 the court
said, were enforceable under the statute.105 By distinguishing between broad
prohibitions and “narrow restraints,” the Ninth Circuit effectively returned to the
traditional common-law distinction that had long been rejected by courts interpreting
CNCs. In doing so, the court “undercut the ‘wise and salutary’ effect of Section
16600’s bright-line rule”106 and created a more employer-friendly standard under
which courts applying the statute would analyze non-competes.
Unlike in Ohio and other states where courts have moved away from an
“employee-friendly” CNC analysis, the changes effectuated by the court in Campbell
were not permanent. The “narrow restraint exceptions” created in Campbell existed
and applied only until the California Supreme Court’s re-examination of Section
100

Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Metro Traffic
Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that section 16600 provides that “every citizen shall retain the right to pursue any
lawful employment and enterprise of their choice.”).
101

KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).

102

Todd M. Malynn, Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP: The End of Judicially Created
Restraints on Competition, 18 No. 1. COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B.
CAL. 35, 44 (2009) (quoting Chamberlain v. Augustine, 156 P. 479, 480 (Cal. 1916)).
103

Campbell v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 817 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1997).

104

Id. (citing Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 714, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).

105

Id. The Campbell court also placed the burden on the employee subject to the noncompete to prove that the restriction operating as a prohibition on engaging in an entire
profession.
106

Malynn, supra note 102, at 45.
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16600 in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP. In Edwards, the court rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s “narrow restraint exceptions” and re-established Section 16600’s “brightline” prohibition against non-competes contained in employment agreements.107 The
court reinforced California’s policy in favor of free competition and employee
mobility,108 and concluded that “section 16600 prohibits employee noncompetition
agreements unless the agreement falls within a statutory exception.”109 Because
Section 16600 provided exceptions for non-competes in the context of the sale or
dissolution of corporations, partnerships, and limited liability corporations,110 the court
interpreted the plain meaning of the statute as prohibiting an employer from using a
contract to restrain a former employee from engaging in his or her profession, trade,
or business.111 By eliminating judicially created exceptions to Section 16600 and
reinforcing California’s public policy in favor of employee mobility, the Edwards
court established the most “employee-friendly” standard for analyzing CNCs.112
III. OHIO SHOULD RE-EXAMINE THE RAIMONDE STANDARD AND FACILITATE A
SHIFT BACK TO THE MORE “EMPLOYEE-FRIENDLY” COMMON-LAW
RESTRICTIVE DOCTRINE
While California’s general prohibition on non-competes does not precisely mirror
the common-law restrictive enforceability analysis, it seems to be far more similar
than Ohio’s relaxed reasonability standard. In fact, California’s current standard might
actually be more “employee-friendly” than the original common-law analysis in that
it has essentially resulted in the illegality of all non-competes contained in
employment agreements. The differences in the standards applied in California and
Ohio are notable, particularly given the economic environment and growth of
particular industries in each state. The basic premise of this Note is that in order for
Ohio to keep up with the national pace of economic recovery, it will need to continue
to foster growth in sectors such as technology and energy. As evidenced by the growth
of Silicon Valley and California’s fast-paced alternative energy sector, these two areas
are thriving and will likely continue to thrive with the evolution of the economy. While
the growth in these sectors cannot be attributed entirely to California’s non-compete
standard, the connection between the use of these provisions and economic growth
should not be understated. Below, I outline several arguments in support of the notion
that the time is right for Ohio to depart from the Raimonde standard and shift back
107

Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008).

108

Id. at 291.

109

Id. at 288.

110

Id. at 290-91.

111

Id. at 291.

112

While not explicitly mentioned in the opinion, the timing of the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Edwards is interesting. The opinion was handed down in 2008, in the midst
of the economic downturn mentioned in the introduction of this note. Though the court
supported its reasoning by stating California’s policy in favor of open competition, it is possible
that the court might have been influenced by the fact that unemployment was reaching high
levels. It might have been difficult for the court to continue to apply the “narrow restraint
exceptions” during this turbulent economic time, as it would be making it harder for people to
gain employment at a time where job opportunities were becoming increasingly scarce.
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toward the more “employee-friendly” principles of the traditional common-law
enforceability analysis.
A. Justification for a Re-Examination of Raimonde in Ohio
1. Problems with the Current Raimonde Standard
The Raimonde standard and analysis for determining the enforceability of noncompetes that continues to be applied in Ohio courts today creates problems for all
parties at various points in the process of deploying restrictive covenants.113 This
confusion reaches attorneys tasked with drafting non-competes for employers or
negotiating employment agreements for prospective employees, as lawyers are unable
to predict with a high level of certainty whether a non-compete will be enforceable in
an Ohio trial court.114 In the event that an employee whose employment relationship
is subject to a CNC terminates his or her employment relationship, both the employee
and employer remain unsure of the proper scope of the restrictive covenant contained
in the agreement.115 Furthermore, in the event that litigation ensues over a noncompete, judges applying the Raimonde standard face confusion in determining how
to properly apply the Supreme Court of Ohio’s analysis.116
The main source of this confusion as it relates to the Raimonde standard is the Ohio
Supreme Court’s apparent adoption of two different standards for determining the
enforceability of a non-compete. While expressly adopting the three-part analysis of
the non-compete,117 the Raimonde court also articulated a list of eight
“reasonableness” factors for courts to weigh before making an ultimate determination
of enforceability.118 As a result of these two seemingly separate standards contained
within the Raimonde opinion, Ohio trial courts do not analyze non-competes in a
uniform fashion. One court may properly analyze the provision using the three-step
reasonableness analysis, but will only consider the “reasonableness factors” if it needs
to modify the non-compete in order to make it “reasonable” under the full analysis.119
113

See Adam V. Buente, Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements in the Buckeye State:
How and Why Ohio Courts Apply the Reasonableness Standard to Entrepreneurs, 8 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 73, 74 (2013).
114 Id. at 86-87 (noting that “the Ohio Supreme Court’s lack of decisions directly addressing
noncompete agreements since Raimonde has only compounded the confusion for Ohio’s trial
attorneys.”).
115 Confusion for employers and employees surrounding non-competes manifests itself in
the example of an employee being unsure of whether certain post-employment activity will be
permissible under the terms of the CNC.
116

Bergeron, supra note 86, at 375-76 (The Raimonde standard “has contributed to confusion
in the lower courts.”).
117 Recall that Raimonde instructs a court to analyze whether the scope of the non-compete
is greater than what is required for the employer’s protection, whether it imposes an undue
burden on the employee, and whether it is injurious to the public. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325
N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ohio 1975); see supra Part II.B.2.
118

Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 547.

119

Bergeron, supra note 86, at 376. See, e.g., Am. Bldg. Serv., Inc. v. Cohen, 603 N.E.2d
432, 434-35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). In American Building Services, the court analyzed a noncompete provision under the three-step Raimonde analysis and concluded that “certain restraints
and the resultant hardship on [the employee] do exceed that which is reasonable to protect [the
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Other Ohio courts use the three-step analysis and “reasonableness factors” in
conjunction to conduct a combined analysis of enforceability.120 Furthermore, the
Ohio Supreme Court has remained relatively silent on the issue of non-compete
enforceability.121 Ohio trial and appellate courts are thus tasked with determining how
to properly apply the Raimonde standard, yielding inconsistent results in CNC
litigation throughout the state.122
While it is clear that there is general confusion among lower Ohio courts as to the
proper application of Raimonde, this confusion manifests itself in more specific
inconsistencies in non-compete cases. Under the current standard, it is unclear whether
Raimonde works to prohibit the enforcement of an overly broad geographic restriction
contained in a CNC. Under Raimonde, a geographic restriction on post-employment
activity (however broad) is not per se unreasonable.123 In Ganguly v. Mead Digital
Systems, an Ohio appellate court enforced a non-compete that contained an unlimited
geographic restriction.124 The Ganguly court justified the enforcement of a worldwide
geographic restriction based in part on the employer’s international reach.125 Given the
employer’s interests across the globe and the fact that the employer was seeking to
protect against the international dissemination of its confidential information, the court
found the restriction to be reasonable.126 In subsequent decisions, Ohio courts have
routinely held that unlimited geographic restrictions are unenforceable.127 In

employer’s] legitimate business interests.” Id. at 434. After making this initial determination of
reasonability, the court applied and analyzed the eight Raimonde reasonability factors to modify
a specific portion of the CNC to bring it into the realm of a “reasonable” non-compete under
the initial three-step analysis. Id. at 435.
120

See, e.g., HCCT, Inc. v. Walters, 651 N.E.2d 25, 27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). The court in
HCCT, after articulating the initial three-step analysis, stated that “the court in Raimonde also
noted the following factors to consider in determining the ‘reasonableness’ of employee
covenants.” Id. In ultimately holding that the non-compete at issue was not reasonable (and
thus, unenforceable), the court supported its conclusion by noting that “(1) the covenants seek
to eliminate ordinary competition, not unfair competition; (2) the benefit to the employer is
disproportional to the detriment to the employee; and (3) . . . [the employer’s] weak interest in
enforcing the covenants.” Id. In supporting its finding that the non-compete was not reasonable
through its analysis of the eight “reasonability factors,” the HCCT court provides an illustrative
example of Ohio courts that read Raimonde to require a combined “reasonableness” test.
121

Bergeron, supra note 86, at 376.

122 Id. (noting that as a result of the confusion surrounding the Raimonde standard, “few, if
any courts, embark on a consideration of all of the listed factors,” and that as a result of the
inconsistent results within state courts, “practitioners are able to find support for just about any
position they wish to advance.”).
123

Id.

124 Ganguly v. Mead Digital Sys., No. 82-1499, 1984 WL 3858, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
20, 1984).
125

Id. at *5 (noting that the employer’s business was “thriving in the United States, Germany,
The [sic] Netherlands, and Japan.”).
126

Id. at *7.

127

See Am. Bldg. Serv., Inc. v. Cohen, 603 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that a geographic restriction which “prohibited [the employee] from working for any business
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comparing these inconsistent results, it appears that an employer is free to enforce an
otherwise unreasonable geographic restriction as part of a non-compete so long as it
can demonstrate some sort of market presence in the area(s) to which the restriction
applies. Tasking courts with determining the extent of a “market presence” that is
sufficient so as to justify the enforcement of an overly broad geographic restriction
requires courts to conduct an analysis far outside of the Raimonde framework, and
could lead to further inconsistencies.
Ohio courts have also been inconsistent in their application of Raimonde to analyze
the enforceability of non-competes that contain durational or time-based
restrictions.128 While Raimonde did not establish any concrete length of time for
enforceable time limitations, attorneys and judges applying the standard often look to
the court’s holding in Rogers v. Runfola & Associates for guidance.129 After finding a
non-compete containing a two-year post-employment restriction to be unreasonable
and refusing to enforce a restriction that prohibited employees from working with the
employer’s clients for the rest of their lives, the Rogers court modified the noncompete to include a restriction that lasted only one year.130 Though the Rogers court
did not explicitly adopt a two-year maximum time limit for non-competes, an attorney
drafting a CNC might reasonably interpret the opinion as limiting these restrictions to
twenty-four months. In analyzing Ohio courts’ treatment of these limits following
Rogers, however, it is clear that there is still a high level of uncertainty as it relates to
durational restrictions. One court found a one-year prohibition in a non-compete to be
unreasonable,131 while another allowed an employer to enforce a CNC that would
restrict the employee’s activity for five years.132 Moreover, Ohio courts seem to fly in
the face of Rogers by routinely enforcing restrictions with durations of longer than
two years133 while subjecting one- to two-year limits to a higher level of scrutiny.134
It is clear after an analysis of Ohio courts’ application of Raimonde that the
standard under which a non-compete will be judged is far from uniform and can
sometimes produce wildly inconsistent results. As courts wrestle with Raimonde,
participants in non-compete litigation are unable to accurately predict the
enforceability of time or geographic restrictions. Furthermore, Ohio courts struggle in
analyzing the interests of the employer and employee as it relates to the non-

which…competes with [the employer] in any county in which [the employer] has any customer
or perspective customer” to be “too unreasonable.”).
128

Bergeron, supra note 86, at 377 (noting that “Ohio courts are nevertheless remarkably
inconsistent in determining what type of time limitations are reasonable.”).
129

See Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540, 544 (Ohio 1991).

130

Id. at 544.

131

Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 791 F.Supp. 1280, 1289 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (modifying a one
year restriction to six months).
132 Parma Int’l Inc. v. Herman, No. 54243, 1989 WL 12928, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16,
1989).
133

Bergeron, supra note 86, at 378 (“A survey of Ohio cases reveals that many courts have
enforced covenants of two years or longer.”).
134

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2015

23

730

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:707

compete135 and seem to be unsure about whether Ohio’s public policy favors the
enforcement of reasonable CNCs.136 While there is inherent uncertainty due to the
flexible nature of a rule of reason, the level of confusion surrounding non-competes in
Ohio is cause for concern.
2. National Trends: More Jurisdictions Are Moving Toward a More “EmployeeFriendly” Standard of Non-Compete Enforceability
In jurisdictions across the United States, courts and legislatures alike are taking
steps to implement standards for determining the enforceability of CNCs contained in
employment agreements that result in a heightened level of judicial scrutiny of these
restrictions. While courts in Ohio are departing from the restrictive common-law
doctrine by broadening the number of non-competes that would be “reasonable” and
enforceable, other states are facilitating shifts back toward the restrictive approach.
As opposed to widening the definition of an enforceable non-compete, these states are
restricting the scope of permissible post-employment restrictions. By reworking the
framework under which state courts are required to analyze non-competes, and by
implementing statutory schemes that work to prevent the enforcement of CNCs, these
states are making “employee-friendly” standards of enforceability far more common.
In some states, courts are implementing a more “employee-friendly” standard for
determining the enforceability of non-competes by limiting the expansion of the
definition of a “legitimate business interest.” By limiting the interests that an employer
is able to protect through use of a non-compete, courts in states such as New York are
effectively narrowing the circumstances under which a court will enforce a restrictive
covenant. In New York, where non-competes are analyzed under a reasonableness
standard very similar to Raimonde, courts would routinely find an employer’s interest
in customer relationships to be “legitimate” for the purposes of the enforceability
analysis.137 Most commonly, New York courts would allow employers within
traditional professional sectors such as medicine to restrict an employee’s ability to
make use of a customer list following termination. In BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, an
employee challenged the enforceability of a non-compete that prohibited contact with
any of the employer’s clients.138 The accounting firm seeking enforcement argued that
as an employer within a professional field analogous to medicine, it had a legitimate
business interest in its customer list that justified enforcement of the non-compete.139
However, the court in BDO refused to extend the “doctrine of unique skills” to
135 See id. at 379-80 (discussing how courts balance the employer’s and employee’s interest
under Raimonde).
136 See id. at 380-81 (discussing whether courts applying Ohio non-compete law find that the
public has an interest in the enforcement of reasonable non-competes).
137

See, e.g., Reed, Roberts & Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976)
(recognizing that an employer has a legitimate interest in “safeguarding that which has made
his business successful” and that restrictive covenants “will be enforceable to the extent
necessary to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets or confidential customer information.”). In
Reed, the New York Court of Appeals noted that employers are able to use non-competes to
protect their interest in customer relationships from former employees “whose skills or services
were unique or extraordinary.” Garrison & Wendt, supra note 68, at 136.
138

BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (N.Y. 1999).

139

Id. at 1226.
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professions such as accounting. In holding that the employer could only protect its
interest in customer relationships learned by the employee during the course of his
employment,140 the court issued a ruling which signals a shift back toward the more
narrow common-law definition of a protectable employer interest.
Other jurisdictions are limiting the scope of enforceable non-competes by
implementing procedural rules that effectively require courts to subject these
provisions to a higher level of scrutiny than that of the standard reasonability analysis.
More specifically, some courts are beginning to revisit the modern legal phenomenon
known as the “blue pencil doctrine,” under which a court is afforded the power to
reform an overly broad non-compete that would otherwise be unenforceable. A
primary example of this shift can be seen in Arizona, where in a recent decision the
state Supreme Court “limited the power of courts to reform an overbroad non-compete
agreement under the blue pencil doctrine, preferring to continue with the more
restrictive common-law approach.”141 In limiting the court’s ability to modify noncompetes initially found to be overly broad, the Arizona Supreme Court noted the
potential for abuse where a judge has free reign to modify a CNC in order to make it
reasonable. A broad application of the blue pencil doctrine, the court said, could result
in a standard under which employers “may create ominous covenants, knowing that if
the words are challenged, courts will modify the agreement to make it enforceable.142
In more recent opinions, courts in Idaho143 and New Hampshire144 have imposed
similar limitations on reformation power; evidence that shifts toward the restrictive
common-law approach may be becoming more commonplace.
As some jurisdictions are facilitating a shift toward a more “employee-friendly”
standard through activity within the judiciary, in other states, legislatures have become
the primary vehicle for change. A brief analysis of legislative activity reveals that in
some states, legislatures are enacting (and courts are interpreting) statutes that limit an
employer’s ability to use non-competes in employment agreements. Nearly fifteen
years ago, the Oklahoma legislature enacted a statute which has been coined by one
author an “extremely restrictive employee noncompete statute.”145 Oklahoma Code
Sections 219A and 219B work in combination to offer employers only one option
should they desire to impose post-employment restrictions on an employee. While
Section 219A imposes a general prohibition on non-competes,146 Section 219B
140

Id.

141

Garrison & Wendt, supra note 68, at 141 (referencing the Arizona Supreme Court’s
decision in Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999); see also
Varsity Gold v. Porzio, 45 P.3d 352, 359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (applying the limits on the
court’s reformation power first established in Valley Medical).
142

Valley Medical, 982 P.2d at 1286.

143

See Freiburger v. J-U-B Eng’rs, Inc., 111 P.3d 100, 109 (Idaho 2005).

144

See Merrimack Valley Wood Prods., Inc. v. Near, 876 A.2d 757, 764-65 (N.H. 2005).

145

Garrison & Wendt, supra note 68, at 145.

146 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A (2001) (mandating that “a person who makes an agreement with
an employer . . . not to compete with the employer after the employment relationship has been
terminated, shall be permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by the former
employer or in a similar business as that conducted by the former employer as long as the former
employee does not directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a combination of goods and
services from the established customers of the former employer;” and that “[a]ny provision in a
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permits contractual provisions that would prohibit a former employee from soliciting
the employer’s customers during the course of a new venture.147 Read in combination,
the only permissible post-employment restrictions in Oklahoma are specific nonsolicitation clauses. Similar statutory limitations on the use of non-competes have
been enacted in North Dakota, Louisiana, and California. Though the limitations
contained in these statutes are not as rigid as Oklahoma’s, courts in these states are
narrowly interpreting the language of the laws and rejecting arguments for exceptions
advanced by employers.148
As evidenced by the shifts outlined above, it is becoming clearer that a shift in
thinking regarding the enforceability of non-competes is taking place in jurisdictions
across the country. As courts and legislatures begin to change the way non-competes
are scrutinized to better resemble the restrictive common-law approach, they are
establishing a legal environment where employees are not as burdened by postemployment restrictions. While it may still be too early to determine whether a similar
change to Ohio’s standard would eliminate the confusion and unpredictability seen
under the Raimonde standard, Ohio may be well suited to take note of (and try to
emulate) these shifts in thinking.
3. Economic Benefit: A More Restrictive Analysis of Non-compete Enforceability
Would Result In Increased Employee Mobility and Could Help to Promote Growth
In New Economic Industries
In addition to the fact that many other states are working to establish more
“employee-friendly” standards for determining when an employer is able to enforce a
non-compete, Ohio could justify similar changes to its analysis by pointing to the
potential economic benefit that could follow. There exists a plethora of economic and
legal literature that attempts to analyze the connection between the standard of CNC
enforceability and its effect on employee mobility. Defined generally, “employee
mobility” is a measure of the ability for workers to move from one job to another.
While the willingness of courts within a particular state to enforce post-employment
restrictions has an obvious connection to overall employee mobility, some scholars
are beginning to analyze the effects of high levels of worker mobility on the economic
well being of certain regions. There is research to suggest that by increasing employee
mobility within the state, Ohio could avail itself of a range of economic benefits that
could facilitate a more rapid recovery.
One of the more well-known arguments as it relates to the connection between
employee mobility and regional economic prosperity was advanced by Ronald Gilson,
a law professor at Stanford and Columbia. Professor Gilson suggests that the rapid
growth and wild success of Silicon Valley’s technology sector can be traced to
California’s treatment of non-competes.149 To illustrate his hypothesis, Gilson
compares Silicon Valley to an area just outside of Boston known as the “Route 128
contract between an employer and an employee in conflict with the provisions of this section
shall be void and unenforceable.”).
147

15 OKLA. STAT. § 219B (2001).

148

Garrison & Wendt, supra note 68, at 146-47.

149

See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575,
578 (1999).
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Corridor.” Silicon Valley and the Route 128 Corridor are similarly situated, each
having the resources and talent needed to develop a thriving hub for the tech industry.
However, growth in Silicon Valley has far outpaced that of the Route 128 Corridor.
Gilson maintains that this disparity in development can be explained primarily by the
different treatment of CNCs under the legal schemes of each state.150 Under
California’s standard for non-compete enforceability, it is “extremely unlikely that
postemployment covenants not to compete will be enforced.”151 In Massachusetts,
courts apply a version of the “reasonableness” analysis used in the majority of other
states.152 Gilson argues that because of the inability to use non-competes, California
tech companies were able to adopt different growth strategies that Massachusetts firms
were unable to visualize and ultimately implement.153 These strategies would prove to
play an essential role in the explosion of tech firms in California, and the strategies
were made possible by California’s general prohibition of post-employment
restrictions.154
By shifting back toward a standard for determining the enforceability of noncompetes that increases employee mobility, Ohio might open itself up to benefits that
could positively impact sectors other than technology. In legal environments where
employers are unable to readily enforce CNCs, labor resources are able to “freely flow
to their highest and best use,” innovation is rewarded, and new businesses “grow,
flourish, and mutually benefit from innovative ideas.”155 Facilitating the free exchange
of ideas through employee mobility is particularly important in fast-paced industries
such as technology, biotechnology, and energy. In these “modern” sectors, many types
of highly technical information are only valuable for one year, maybe two.156 By
limiting an employee’s mobility for even one year following the termination of an
employment relationship, employers are potentially stifling innovation within their
particular industry. While Ohio does have an interest in protecting the legitimate
competitive interests of entities doing business within the state (particularly in newer
industries), this protection is possible without the strict enforcement of noncompetes.157 If Ohio can increase employee mobility by implementing a more
“employee-friendly” standard for analyzing non-competes, it would be taking a

150

Id. at 613.

151

Id. at 608.

152

Id. at 604.

153

Id. at 608-09.

154

Id.

155 Malynn, supra note 102, at 45 (citing Gilson, supra note 149, at 603-09); see also Mark
A. Glick et al., The Law and Economics of Post Employment Covenants: A Unified Framework,
11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 403 (2002) (noting that “[i]nnovation is perhaps the competitive
motivator for technologically based economies, and restraints on the mobility of the innovators
may stifle innovation and therefore competition.”).
156

Gilson, supra note 149, at 603 (“Given the speed of innovation and the corresponding
telescoping of product life cycles, knowledge more than a year or two old likely no longer has
significant competitive value.”).
157 Id. at 610. (analyzing Alan Hyde’s argument that the rapid growth of the Silicon Valley
can be attributed to California’s system for protecting trade secrets).
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significant step toward creating an environment conducive to growth in new
industries.
Gilson’s theory that less stringent non-compete enforcement eventually leads to a
better environment for economic growth through increased employee mobility has
been verified empirically. In a Harvard Business School study, three professors
analyzed growth in Michigan’s technology industry during two different time
periods.158 More specifically, the study sets out to analyze “whether there is a ‘brain
drain’ of talented engineers and scientists who leave states that allow non-competes
and move to states that don’t.” Prior to 1985, Michigan courts analyzing CNCs were
required to do so within the boundaries of a statutory scheme similar to the one
currently in effect in California. In 1985, the Michigan legislature brought the state’s
policy on non-competes into line with the majority of states who adopted a permissive
analysis of the provisions by passing the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act.159 Under the
act, which repealed an antiquated statute that contained a general prohibition on the
use of non-competes, employers were free to make use of the once presumptively
invalid post-employment restrictions in employment agreements.160 In analyzing the
ten years leading up to and following the legalization of non-competes in Michigan,
the Harvard professors found a connection between the enforceability of CNCs and
the rate at which talented professionals were taking their expertise elsewhere. As a
result of the new legislation, Michigan’s “rate of emigration” increased to a level
nearly five times that of the previous scheme.161 During the same time period, the rate
of emigration in states where non-competes are unenforceable slightly decreased.162
Additionally, the study found that those leaving Michigan during the time period were
more likely to move to those states where employee mobility was far less limited.163
In addition to fostering an economic environment that creates opportunity for
newer industry, a re-examination of Ohio’s non-compete standards could make it more
likely that talented employees continue to contribute to the state for a longer period of
time. With these possible benefits on the table, Ohio would be more than justified in
at least contemplating a shift back toward the common-law restrictive doctrine of CNC
enforceability. In the wake of the 2008 economic downturn, it is clear that Ohio’s
economy needs to continue to change and remain versatile in order to keep up with
the national pace of recovery. As the state continues to improve its business
environment by attempting to foster growth in emerging industries, contemplating

158 Carmen Nobel, Non-competes Push Talent Away, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL:
WORKING KNOWLEDGE (July 11, 2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6759.html (discussing Matt
Marx et al., Noncompetes and Inventor Mobility: Specialists, Stars and the Michigan
Experiment, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH (Jan. 17, 2007), available
at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-042.pdf).
159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id. (“The paper explains that from 1975 to 1996 – the period surrounding the 1985 policy
reversal – the rate of emigration grew in Michigan (0.24% to 1.18%).”).
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changes to its non-compete standard could be a reform that helps to complete the
turnaround beginning to accelerate across the state.164
4. Other Public Policy Justifications
In addition to the problems with Ohio’s current standard, the emerging national
trends relating to treatment of non-competes, and the potential for economic benefit
under a new analysis, there are public policy arguments that support a change in Ohio.
One policy justification, often overlooked in the CNC discussion, is that CNCs are no
longer suited to protect the interests of the parties to the modern employer-employee
relationship. While employers had heavy interest in using non-competes in a
traditional manufacturing-based economy, the nature of the typical employment
relationship has changed in ways that make the use of non-competes seem
counterintuitive. Prior to the information revolution of the 1980s, employers and
employees forming new relationships were primarily concerned with longevity and
consistency.165 Employers wanted their employees to remain with the company for an
extended period of time, and employees sought commitment, the ability to grow
within the structure of the firm, and job security. As a result, both parties would enter
into new employment relationships with a mutual understanding that the employer
would provide this stability in exchange for employee-loyalty. To better facilitate this
exchange, firms would commonly invest in their employees through training and
development programs that provided an incentive for the employee to continue
working for the company.
However, the nature of the typical employment relationship has drastically shifted
as our economy has moved into the “Information Age” and is now far more dependent
on fast paced industries. As opposed to longevity and stability, this new relationship
between firm and worker can be characterized as a highly mobile one, with limited
security and a lower expectation of long-term loyalty.166 In addition to changes in the
interactions and expectations of parties to an employment relationship, companies in
this modern economy are changing the way they do business. These changes – such
as increased flexibility in strategy, downsizing, and cost-cutting – reflect modern
firms’ desire to remain as competitive as possible to ensure long term viability.167 As
164

Jackie Borchardt, New business filings in Ohio increased for fifth year in a row, THE PLAIN
DEALER,
Jan.
15,
2015,
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2015/01/new_
business_filings_in_ohio_i_1.html#incart_river (“New business filings increased in 2014 for the
fifth year in a row” according to the Ohio Secretary of State’s office); Joe Bargmann, Medicine,
Manufacturers, and Furniture-Makers Turned Cleveland Into an Innovation Hub, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Jan. 2015, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/news/clevelandstartup-city-framework-furniture-makers-17612064 (analyzing Cleveland’s growth in small
manufacturing and medical and biotech hardware and software).
165

Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 725 (2002) (noting that to promote
longevity in an employment relationship, “[o]ur labor and employment laws have been
constructed on the basis of a view of the employment relationship that saw the employment
relationship as a long-term relationship between a firm and an employee in which the employer
gave the worker an implicit promise of lifetime job security and opportunities for promotion
along clearly-defined job ladders.”).
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Id. at 762; Garrison & Wendt, supra note 68, at 166.
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Garrison & Wendt, supra note 68, at 166.
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a result, the stability of the traditional employment relationship has become a relic of
the past and employees are adapting to an environment where employee mobility is
not only common but also necessary. One of the long-standing justifications for the
enforcement of non-competes is that these provisions allow employers to protect their
investment in employees.168 However, the utility of strict enforcement of CNCs as
applied to today’s uncertain employment relationship seems limited given employers’
lack of interest in promoting longevity through investment in employees.
B. Proposed Solution: Ohio Should Implement a Non-compete Analysis that Creates
a Rebuttable Presumption of Unenforceability
To recap, the basic theory of this Note is such: less stringent enforcement of noncompetes contained in employment agreements would lead to increased employee
mobility, which in turn would create more fertile ground in Ohio for economic growth
in emerging sectors that will be necessary for a complete economic recovery. Given
the problems with the Raimonde standard and Ohio’s need to capitalize on any
possibility for economic growth, a re-analysis of judicial treatment of CNCs seems
more than justified. Accordingly, there are several methods by which the state of Ohio
could facilitate a change in thinking with regard to use and enforcement of these
restrictive covenants that would bring its standard in line with the more employeefriendly courts of other states. Ohio courts could start by implementing a refined
analysis of non-compete enforceability. In mirroring changes made in other
jurisdictions, such as narrowly defining the list of “protectable employer interests” and
limiting reformation power, Ohio courts would find that some non-competes sufficient
under the Raimonde standard would no longer be enforceable.
A second possible change could come from the state legislature. By enacting a
statute that requires courts to treat CNCs within a statutory framework, courts would
have guidance that could eliminate confusion and unpredictability. The legislature of
course could take more drastic measures by mandating that all non-competes are per
se unenforceable, similar to the schemes in effect in California and North Dakota. The
third and most practical option, and the suggestion advocated for by this Note, consists
of a combination of judicial and legislative action. By implementing legislation that
would effectively spell out the enforceability analysis to be used by courts, and
allowing courts to interpret and develop this legislation as cases are litigated, Ohio can
effectively modify the Raimonde analysis in hopes of moving toward a more
permissive non-compete standard.
1. Potential Solutions
a. Purely Court Facilitated
Ohio courts could take matters into their own hands and resolve to change their
overall stance by declining to extend Raimonde and instead apply a new judiciallycreated analysis. Through this change in thinking, Ohio courts could use other
precedent (taking the lead of other jurisdictions who have already affected similar
changes) to implement a more “employee-friendly” standard of enforceability to
increase employee mobility. As a starting point, Ohio courts at various levels would
need to clear up the current confusion surrounding Raimonde by overruling the
168 See generally Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to
Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1981) (claiming that employers need not competes to protect
their interest in “human capital” that they have invested in and developed over time).
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opinion or clarifying the seemingly two separate standards that were announced in
1975. The extent to which the court could choose to change the standard would be
entirely dependent on its ability to work within the grove of Raimonde precedent.
While this would be a tall task, clarifying the relationship between the three-part
analysis and “reasonability” factors would seem like a logical place to begin. A
clarifying opinion would eliminate many of the inconsistencies in CNC litigation and
would make it far easier for parties to these restrictive clauses to accurately predict the
extent to which they would be enforceable in the event of litigation.169
In handing down this clarifying opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court could change
the Raimonde analysis by holding that the list of “reasonability” factors should be
treated by lower courts as an elaboration of the initial three-step analysis. Recall that
Ohio courts treat these eight factors either as part of the overall reasonableness inquiry
or as support for modifying a CNC that is unreasonable by its terms. By explicitly
requiring lower courts to apply these factors as part of their initial three-part inquiry,
employees would be given a better opportunity to make an argument as to why the
non-compete is unreasonable at the critical first juncture, as opposed to after the fact.
Employees would be allowed to make use of the “reasonableness” factors in every
non-compete inquiry rather than under the current interpretation of Raimonde that
makes limited use of this broad range of factors.170
Treating the “reasonableness factors” as an elaboration of the three-step Raimonde
analysis would result in a more employee-friendly analysis. There are some Ohio
jurisdictions which are already analyzing CNCs under this slightly different standard,
and in those courts an employer’s ability to enforce restrictive covenants seems to be
far more limited. HCCT Inc., v. Walters provides an illustrative example of how a
court would apply the Raimonde reasonableness factors as part of the overall
reasonability analysis, instead of independently or in the context of reformation.171 The
appellate court in HCCT affirmed a trial court ruling that a non-compete between a
hair stylist and her former employer was unenforceable under Raimonde.172 In
reviewing the lower court decision, the court read the Raimonde opinion to require the
169 Increased predictability would potentially benefit an employee deciding whether entering
into a non-compete would be in his or her best interest by effectively increasing the bargaining
power during the employment negotiation process. If an employee is able to make an educated
decision in negotiating the terms of the employment and any restrictive covenant, the likelihood
that he or she will simply sign the agreement for fear of missing out on a job opportunity would
decrease. A more predictable standard will allow an employee in the midst of negotiation to
better analyze the CNC and make a more informed decision. Increased predictability would also
benefit employers, attorneys, and judges, as a higher level of certainty would ultimately save
time and money in the event of litigation.
170 In considering the “reasonableness” factors as a part of the overall enforceability analysis,
Ohio courts could be forced to consider these factors when analyzing every dispute over a noncompete. In courts where judges are unsure of the proper role of the eight factors, they play a
limited role in the initial three-step Raimonde inquiry. While an employee seeking to avoid
enforcement is free to use these factors in arguing that the non-compete is unreasonable, a court
will not consider them independently and instead will consider them within the framework of
the three larger questions. As a result, employees seeking to stress one of the secondary factors
in arguing unenforceability seem to face a more challenging task.
171

HCCT, Inc. v. Walters, 651 N.E.2d 25, 27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
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court to consider the “reasonableness” factors “in determining the ‘reasonableness’ of
employee covenants.”173 The court then conducted an analysis of each of the eight
factors under the overall three-step reasonableness inquiry. While it found that some
of the factors supported enforcement of the provision, the court based its ultimate
determination on the fact that three of the eight factors weighed in favor of the
employee.174 The HCCT court seemed to use the eight factors in its analysis of the first
three questions of the “reasonableness” analysis, as opposed to deploying them after
determining whether the restriction was reasonable on its face. In looking at the
reasoning of this court and others across the state who have taken the same approach,
it becomes increasingly clear that incorporating the “reasonableness” factors into the
initial inquiry results in the court applying a standard where a finding of enforceability
becomes less likely.175
In addition to clarifying the Raimonde analysis, Ohio courts could follow the lead
of other jurisdictions in taking steps to refine Ohio’s standard in a way that results in
more scrutiny for non-competes. As discussed, courts across the country are beginning
to make small changes by issuing rulings under the “reasonableness” analysis that
signal a shift back toward a more restrictive approach to CNCs. Recall that these basic
shifts include limiting the interests that a business can legitimately seek to protect
through use of a non-compete, restricting the permissible scope of CNCs, and limiting
judicial reform power. Currently, Ohio courts seem to be engaged in a continuous
expansion of the list of “legitimate interests” protectable under non-competes.176 By
narrowing their definition of a protectable employer interest, taking the lead of states
173

Id.

174

Id. (“This court agrees with the trial court that (1) the covenants seek to eliminate mere
ordinary competition, not unfair competition; (2) the benefit to the employer is disproportional
to the detriment of the employee; and (3) in view of appellant’s weak interests in enforcing the
covenant, the contract is unreasonable and unenforceable.”).
175

See, e.g., Mark Philips Salon/Spa v. Blessing, No. 23875, 2011 WL 332755 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2011) (holding a non-compete to be unenforceable while noting that “[a] court determining
the enforceability of a covenant not to compete must analyze ‘whether the covenant seeks to
eliminate competition which would be unfair to the employer or merely seeks to eliminate
ordinary competition.’”); Moda Hair Designs, Inc. v. Dechert, No. 2005CA00192, 2006 WL
337373 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (analyzing “the trial court’s assessment in light of the enumerated
factors set forth in Raimonde” and finding that after weighing the factors, the non-compete
provision was not enforceable); Busch v. Premier Integrated Med. Assoc., Ltd., No. 19364,
2003 WL 22060392 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding a non-compete to be unenforceable after
noting that “[a]mong the factors that Raimonde identified as relevant to this inquiry is ‘whether
the covenant seeks to eliminate competition which would be unfair to the employer or merely
seeks to eliminate ordinary competition.’”). But see, e.g., Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Agency of
Dayton, Inc. v. Reynolds, 610 N.E.2d 1102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
176

See, e.g., Owusu v. Hope Cancer Ctr. of Northwest Ohio, Inc., No. 19364, 2011 WL
3890516 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (holding that an employer had a legitimate interest in protecting
physician referral connections, citing the Sixth District Court of Appeals in Wall v. Firelands
Radiology, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)); Life Line Screening of Am., Ltd. v.
Calger, 881 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 2006) (holding that the employer had protectable
interests in its testing protocols, technician training methods, and marketing strategies);
Brentlinger Enterprises v. Curran, 752 N.E.2d 994 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an
employer had a legitimate business interest in retaining relationships with existing customers);
Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540 (Ohio 1991).
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where these changes have already occurred,177 Ohio courts could begin to limit
circumstances under which an employer could readily enforce a non-compete. As it
relates to the issues posed by judicial reformation power, Ohio’s remedy might lie in
establishing that the reasonableness factors are to be part of the initial reasonability
inquiry, and should not be used to support a finding that a CNC warrants
modification.178 To limit reformation power further, Ohio courts could pull in the
reigns on this authority in a manner similar to that which has occurred in states like
Arizona by establishing a firm list of circumstances where reformation is permitted.
b. Legislative Overhaul
Given the Supreme Court’s apparent desire to avoid revisiting or altering
Raimonde, a more effective route for change may be found in the Ohio legislature. By
enacting legislation that expressly prohibits or severely limits the enforceability of
non-competes, Ohio lawmakers could play their part in effectuating a shift back
toward a more restrictive enforceability analysis.
The first legislative option would be Ohio’s enactment of a statutory scheme that
is identical or very similar to Section 16600 of the California Business Code.179 This
statute could contain a flat prohibition on the use and enforcement of non-competes
or limit their utility by narrowly defining circumstances in which a restrictive covenant
is enforceable. Whether highly restrictive or slightly less permissive than the
Raimonde standard, a statute would be beneficial if drafted in a way that increases
employee mobility while reducing the confusion under the reasonableness analysis. It
would still be up to the Ohio courts to interpret and apply the statute, which creates
room for flexibility if needed due to further unforeseen changes to the economy. While
a statute with a general prohibition on non-competes would undoubtedly help to
maximize employee mobility, there are legitimate concerns regarding employers’
ability to protect proprietary information learned by employees. As a supplement to
the non-compete statutes, Ohio would be wise to revisit its trade secrets protection
scheme. Employers may see less of an incentive to use non-competes if their
intellectual property is adequately protected.180 A wholesale legislative change to a
California-like scheme would require a large amount of political capital, and given the
current political climate, would be highly unlikely.
A second, less drastic option for legislative change would be Ohio’s adoption of a
statutory scheme similar to that currently in effect in Colorado. A statute that places
firm limits on non-compete enforcement but does not impose an outright ban on the
clauses might be more attractive than the “all or nothing approach” of California.
Under the Colorado restricted enforcement statute, one is guilty of a misdemeanor
177

See BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1226 (N.Y. 1999); Frieburger v. J-UB Engineers, Inc., 111 P.3d 100, 105 (Idaho 2005) (holding that an employer had a narrow
protectable interest in “customer relationships its former employee established and nurtured
while employed with the former employer.”).
178

Ohio courts have already recognized that reformation of an unreasonable non-compete is
not mandatory. Graphics v. Lake-Perry, No. 70696, 1997 WL 35568 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
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See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §16600.

180

For example, employers who use non-competes for the primary purpose of protecting
company information could simply rely on the statutory scheme and avoid using restrictive
covenants.
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penalty if they are found to have entered into a non-compete.181 The statute goes on to
outline four, narrowly and specifically defined exceptions for situations where the
general prohibition is not applicable. The exceptions include situations where use of
the non-compete relates to: the purchase or sale of a business or business assets;182
trade secret protection; recovery of training expenses for employees of less than a twoyear tenure; and (4) executive or management employees and their professional
staff.183 By imposing a general prohibition with well-defined exceptions, the Colorado
legislature has taken much of the guess-work out of the judicial non-compete analysis.
The general prohibition promotes the employee’s interest in mobility and the
exceptions protect certain employer interests that are pre-defined as “legitimate”,
while the statute as a whole promotes the general public policy of the state as defined
by elected representatives. As one commentator notes, the Colorado scheme “strikes
the necessary balance between providing a clear rule that addresses both policy and
predictability concerns and acknowledging the need for the enforcement of covenants
not to compete in certain situations.”184
c. Combination
Should Ohio choose to rethink its approach to the enforceability of non-competes,
its most attractive option would be implementing a solution that combines the
alternatives discussed above. By advocating for and eventually passing legislation that
would create a more well-defined standard for enforcement, Ohio could move out of
the Raimonde era and provide a more-employee friendly environment to promote
growth in emerging industries. The proposed statutory scheme, which is discussed
below, would create a statutory framework within which courts analyzing CNCs
would be required to operate. The statute would leave some room for judicial
application and interpretation and avoid an overly formalistic or mechanical analysis.
By leaving certain aspects of the analysis up to the discretion of those trained in the
law, the standard would remain flexible enough to change as the economy evolves and
public policy embraces new values.
2. The New Standard: A Rebuttable Presumption of Unenforceability
Through a new legislative scheme and judicial interpretation and application, Ohio
can create a standard under which non-competes contained in employment agreements
are per se unenforceable. Creating a presumption of unenforceability would help to
shift Ohio’s standard back toward the more restrictive common-law approach and
would mirror the judicial analysis used when non-competes first appeared. This
presumption would take the form of a rebuttable presumption, a concept most easily
illustrated using a common tort law example. In tort, a violation of a particular statute
181

COLO. REV. STAT. §§8-2-113 – 115 (2014).
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In fact, Ohio courts already seem to carve out a similar exception when analyzing noncompetes in the context of the sale of a business. Ohio courts generally view these clauses with
a lower level of scrutiny that a CNC contained in an employment agreement. See Century
Business Servs., Inc. v. Urban, 900 N.E.2d 1048 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
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Christine M. O’Malley, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech
Industry: Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1233 (1999)
(arguing that Massachusetts should adopt a statute similarly modeling Colorado’s scheme).
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creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant.185 The
defendant is able to overcome this presumption by making a showing to the court that
the violation of the statute is excusable and should not be considered “negligent” under
the particular set of circumstances when the alleged tort occurred. My proposed
standard for non-compete enforceability would mirror this basic tort law principle.
The proposed statute would borrow from Colorado in that it would establish a set of
narrow, well-defined circumstances under which an employer could rebut the
presumption of unenforceability. The statute would also afford an employer the
opportunity to rebut the presumption by showing that although one of the defined
exceptions does not apply, the circumstances surrounding the non-compete justify its
enforcement.
To briefly summarize, under my proposed standard a CNC would be per se illegal.
An employer however, would be able to rebut the presumption of unenforceability by
showing that a statutory exception exists or that “reasonableness factors” weigh in
favor of enforcement. The main aspect and “teeth” of my proposed statutory scheme
would be the presumption of unenforceability. As noted, the statutory language would
effectively work to make any post-employment restrictive covenant that is used in an
employment agreement per se unenforceable. Like the analysis deployed by
California courts, Ohio courts would be required to analyze non-competes with a high
level of initial skepticism. Unlike in California, however, this presumption would be
rebuttable under the statute. Thus the initial burden is placed on the employer under
all circumstances to make a showing to the court as to why the court should enforce
the non-compete under the circumstances of the particular action. In not requiring an
employee to make a showing that the provision is unreasonable, courts operating under
this standard would provide employees with somewhat of a “head start” should a noncompete dispute evolve into litigation.
In recognizing that non-competition clauses are still valuable to employers for the
protection of certain interests (such as trade secrets), there will be a variety of ways in
which an employer could make a showing sufficient to rebut the presumption. An
employer could rebut this presumption by demonstrating exceptional circumstances
that motivated the use of the non-compete and justify its enforcement. These
circumstances would include restrictions used in the context of the sale or transfer of
businesses, or for restrictions in place primarily to protect intellectual property or trade
secrets. If an employer can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of these
exceptions exists, a court will have the power to mandate enforcement of the CNC. In
addition to the listed exceptions within the statute that will essentially result in an
automatic rebuttal of the unenforceability presumption, the statutory scheme will also
provide a list of other factors to be considered by a reviewing court. These other
factors, which would mirror the reasonableness factors announced in Raimonde,
would in practice be used in combination by an employer to rebut the presumption.
The latter portion of the statute would operate as follows in the context of a noncompete contained in an employment agreement. A non-compete that an employer is
attempting to enforce following the termination of an employment agreement would
be unenforceable by its terms. The employer would then make a showing to the court
that the Raimonde “reasonableness” factors weigh in favor of the employer and that
the enforcement of the restriction would be reasonable. The employer could show, for
185 See generally “PRIMA FACIE” NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE “PER SE,” 70 OHIO JUR.3D
Negligence §4 (outlining the basic principles of negligence per se).
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example, that the non-compete does not limit ordinary competition and that the
employee possesses confidential company information at risk of misuse for the benefit
of a third party. The court would then analyze the remainder of the factors and make
an ultimate determination regarding whether the presumption is overcome. The court
would be required to give equal weight to each factor, essentially resulting in an equal
balancing of employer and employee interests. Furthermore, the court could use
existing Raimonde precedent for instruction on whether certain facts tip a particular
factor in favor of the employer or employee. Overall, the standard would result in more
predictability and less confusion, as employers, employees and attorneys would be
clear on which factors would be used by the court in its determination. Instead of
simply determining whether a non-compete in an employment agreement is
“reasonable,” courts will instead be tasked with determining whether the clause is
structured in a way and used under circumstances that overcomes the presumption of
unenforceability.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the field of non-compete litigation is muddled and unpredictable in Ohio,
the state would go a long way in at least considering a shift in thinking. By considering
the arguments and alternatives presented above, Ohio could rework its CNC standard
in a way that would maximize the potential for employee mobility and economic
growth. The shifts taking place in Ohio’s economic climate and the onset of growth in
emerging industries such as technology, healthcare, and energy show that Ohio might
be on the cusp of unparalleled economic development. The need to continue growth
in these sectors and keep pace with economic development in other regions alone is
sufficient justification for a contemplation of change. Creating a more “employeefriendly” standard and increasing employee mobility is one proactive step that our
state can take to make sure that we are not left behind when the book is closed on the
2008 financial crisis. While other economic development is undoubtedly necessary to
ensure a full recovery, increasing employee mobility and creating a more attractive
environment for new businesses is certainly a start.
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